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light of key countries' tendencies to subordinate nuclear nonproliferation to short-term profits, 
it is important for those concerned by the spread of nuclear weapons to know that they 
need not idly wait on Security Council or European Union enforcement of the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime but can instead play a role themselves. 
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime and Nuclear Realities: 
Repair or Reassessment? 
By Jack M. Beardt 
Many observers in 1963 might have viewed the proposition that only nine nations would 
have nuclear weapons in the year 2007 as highly unlikely.1 What prevented the cascade of 
new nuclear weapons states that was anticipated forty years ago, and how could the answer 
benefit modem attempts to limit nuclear proliferation? Even though the pillar of the current 
nonproliferation regime, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (the NPT),2 may make it 
somewhat harder or costlier for states to acquire or develop nuclear weapons technology, it 
is difficult empirically to establish a causal link between the NPT and the limited number 
of states with nuclear weapons in their arsenals today. 
Some commentators praise the NPT regime and assert that it has played a critical, if not 
all-important, role in constraining nuclear proliferation. Yet in analyzing the reasons behind 
this phenomenon, it is difficult to disassociate or dismiss other possible interests, issues, or 
considerations that can also motivate states to forego possession of nuclear weapons. For 
example, basic factors such as the great expense associated with the development of nuclear 
weapons or the lack of perceived catastrophic security threats may in some cases discourage 
states from choosing the nuclear path. Additionally, in a recent case in which restraint failed, 
the NPT appears to have been largely irrelevant: North Korea simply announced its withdrawal 
from the treaty in 2003 and then proceeded with the apparently successful development and 
testing of a nuclear bomb in 2006. 
Rather than concluding that the limited number of nuclear states is due to the overarching 
influence of the NPT regime, much of this restraint may be better explained by other factors, 
particularly the dynamic effect of the existing geopolitical framework. This framework is 
dominated by powerful states that continue to maintain nuclear weapons as an indispensable 
component of their strategic policies, provide security assurances and nuclear umbrellas for 
their allies, and exert their influence through various instruments, policies, and activities to 
discourage non-nuclear states from acquiring these weapons. Instead of focusing attention 
on repair of the NPT regime, history suggests that a more fundamental reassessment of the 
factors behind nuclear nonproliferation may be appropriate. Such a reassessment also serves 
to highlight serious tensions intrinsic to the NPT regime. 
Bilateral arms control and multilateral disarmament regimes have demonstrated the ability 
significantly to assist states in reducing or eliminating various types or classes of weapons. 
To be effective, however, such regimes must be based on sound design elements, impose 
coextensive obligations on the parties related to the weapons systems to be reduced or 
* 
Professorial Lecturer, UCLA Law School. 
1 
At a press conference in 1963, President Kennedy remarked that "personally I am haunted by the feeling that 
by 1970, unless we are successful, there may be ten nuclear powers instead of four, and by 1975, 15 or 20." Text 
of President Kennedy's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Affairs, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1963, at 4. 
2 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 UST 483, 729 UNTS 161, entered into 
force March 5, 1970. 
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destroyed, and enjoy the meaningful participation of all regime members, especially the 
most powerful ones. By way of contrast, the NPT is an unusual asymmetrical multilateral 
disarmament regime that makes the vast majority of states in the world bear the burden of 
its most serious obligations: these non-nuclear weapons states must ensure that they remain 
so by refraining from acquiring or transferring restricted technology and by subjecting 
themselves to various safeguard requirements and controls over their peaceful nuclear activi 
ties. In return, access to peaceful nuclear technology is to be encouraged and total nuclear 
disarmament is to be promoted. Several states explicitly are permitted, however, to keep 
their nuclear arsenals for an undefined period, subject to the requirement that they "pursue 
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms 
race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control."3 
If nuclear weapons states have no intention of fulfilling their NPT disarmament obligations, 
the so-called "grand bargain" of the NPT becomes a hollow promise, subjecting the regime 
to justified criticism by non-nuclear weapons states that it is discriminatory. Such a conclusion 
has serious, if not fatal, implications for the NPT as a meaningful constraint on nuclear 
proliferation. Unfortunately, the geopolitical realities associated with nuclear weapons do 
not correspond with the legal framework envisioned by Article VI of the NPT. Instead of 
moving towards nuclear disarmament, the nuclear weapons states continue to maintain na 
tional security policies centered on nuclear weapons capabilities and the most powerful of 
these states are more likely to be planning to replace or improve their aging nuclear arsenals 
than eliminating them.4 The utility of nuclear weapons, particularly as instruments of strategic 
deterrence, thus has complicated treaty-based efforts to abolish them legally and has also 
impeded the development of a customary international legal norm banning their use in all 
circumstances.5 
Some scholars argue that a norm against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and a taboo 
against their use have served to reinforce each other, advancing the theory that this taboo 
can play an important part in helping to deter nuclear proliferation.6 As is the case in 
attempting to demonstrate the impact of the NPTs legal restraints, empirically establishing 
the causal pathways between nuclear nonproliferation and a purported normative restraint is 
also a problematic undertaking. Even if a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons exists, 
it is not apparent that it readily translates into a taboo against their development and possession. 
In fact, several arguments can be made against the existence of any such normative opprobrium 
being attached to their development and possession, particularly when compared with attitudes 
towards other weapons that are more widely regarded by the international community as 
abhorrent. 
3 
Id., Art. VI. 
4 
For example, the Bush Administration recently proposed a multibillion-dollar plan to create a new generation 
of nuclear warheads. The plan has generated criticism, particularly in the context of the failure of the United States 
to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. See Walter Pincus, Congress Skeptical of Warhead Plan: Lawmakers 
and Experts Question Necessity, Implications of a New Nuclear Weapon, Wash. Post, Apr. 22, 2007, at A05 
(quoting former Senator Sam Nunn as saying that "If Congress gives a green light to this program in our current 
world environment... I believe that this will be misunderstood by our allies, exploited by our adversaries, [and] 
complicate our work to prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons."). 
5 
See Advisory Opinion on The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 ICJ Rep. 1, at 33 ("The 
emergence, as lex lata, of a customary rule specifically prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons as such is hampered 
by the continuing tensions between the nascent opinio juris on the one hand, and the still strong adherence to the 
practice of deterrence on the other."). 
6 
See, e.g., Nina Tannenwald, Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo, 29 Int'l Security, No. 
4, 5, 41 (Spring 2005). 
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First, in stark contrast to other multilateral disarmament regimes banning all member states 
from developing, producing, stockpiling, or otherwise acquiring or retaining a particular 
type of weapon?such as the regimes banning biological and chemical weapons?the NPT 
explicitly permits some states to possess nuclear weapons and in so doing makes the prohibi 
tion in that agreement less than universal.7 
Second, unlike biological or chemical weapons, nuclear weapons continue to play a key 
role in the national security policies of the most powerful states and thus may be seen as 
conveying a corresponding level of status. Nuclear weapons and important related facilities 
such as those required for the uranium enrichment process are in fact increasingly viewed 
by some states as symbols of technical sophistication, prowess, and prestige, rather than as 
badges of shame or dishonor.8 Difficulties in stigmatizing nuclear weapons have been present 
since they were first used, due in part to their introduction by the victorious allies to defeat 
a Japanese war of aggression.9 In contrast to the revulsion generated by the use of chemical 
weapons in World War I that led to an international conference banning the use of both 
chemical and biological weapons in 1925, nuclear weapons unfortunately were embraced 
after World War II by the leading states of the world and immediately came to be accepted 
as symbols of power and technological achievement. As such, some countries and cultures 
may view nuclear weapons in a favorable light, instead of loathing or detesting them.10 
Finally, even though some cultures and countries may consider nuclear weapons to be 
repugnant, this does not mean that these cultures and countries are not willing to rely on the 
nuclear weapons capabilities of their allies for their own security.11 
While it is difficult empirically to establish that legal constraints and alleged normative 
prohibitions are the cause of nuclear nonproliferation since 1963, there is no shortage of 
examples of nuclear weapons states creating disincentives for other states to develop their 
7 
See Article 1, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 ILM 800 (the "CWC"); Article 1, Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons 
and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 UST 583, 1015 UNTS 163 (the "BWC"). Although the BWC is 
deeply flawed by indeterminate language in its key provisions and by a lack of mandatory transparency mechanisms, 
neither the BWC nor the CWC explicitly exempt any state party from compliance with each regime's respective 
disarmament obligations. Proponents of a taboo against nuclear weapons concede that the lack of a universal nuclear 
prohibition in the NPT "departs in some ways from the objective characteristics of a taboo." See e.g., Tannenwald, 
supra note 6, at 9. 
8 
Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has observed that the uranium 
enrichment process, which is a key capability in the building of a nuclear weapon, has come to be viewed as a 
symbol of power and prestige by some states. See Daniel Dombey, Pressure Mounts on Iran over its Nuclear 
Programme, Fin. Times (London), Feb. 21, 2007 (quoting ElBaradei as saying that "Iran sees enrichment. 
. . as 
a strategic goal because they feel that this will bring them power, prestige and influence.") 
9 
See Richard Falk, The Challenges of Biological Weaponry: A Twenty-First-Century Assessment, in Biological 
Warfare and Disarmament, in Biological Warfare and Disarmament: New Problems/New Perspectives 41 
42 (Susan Wright ed., 2002). 
10 
Whether the underlying motives were perceived strategic needs or national pride, the development and testing 
of nuclear weapons by India, Pakistan, and North Korea, and questionable nuclear activities being pursued by Iran 
raise serious questions about the relevance of any nuclear taboo on the decision-makers in these states. See, e.g., 
John J. Mearsheimer, India Needs The Bomb, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 2000, at A21 ("India did not acquire these 
[nuclear] weapons for frivolous reasons, like misplaced pride or domestic politics, as some Americans believe. 
Rather, India, like the United States, had sound strategic reasons for wanting mem."); Simon Rosenblum and Ernie 
Regehr, The Status of Nuclear Weapons, Toronto Star, June 16, 1998, at A19 ("Nuclear weapons by virtue of 
the legitimacy invested in them by the policies and arsenals of the major nuclear powers, are still thought to convey 
status, enhance national pride, and force the world to reckon with any state that acquires them. Who can doubt 
that the people of India and Pakistan feel that the possession of nuclear weapons will put them on the world's 
political map?"); Karl Vick, Iranians Assert Right To Nuclear Weapons; Issue Unites Conservatives, Reformers, 
Wash. Post, Mar. 11, 2003, at A16 ("Wliile maintaining that their country is not developing nuclear weapons, 
Iranians argue strenuously and with rare unanimity that they have a right to such weapons, to balance Israel's 
arsenal and as a manifestation of national pride.") 
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own nuclear weapons or providing reasons for them to abandon nascent nuclear weapons 
programs.12 Even those scholars who believe that the NPT is responsible for preventing 
nuclear anarchy recognize that the security assurances provided by nuclear weapons states 
have always been an essential part of the larger nuclear non-proliferation regime.13 The 
question presented is whether the NPT has been the driving force behind nuclear nonprolifera 
tion or whether it actually has played only a minor role in comparison with other factors, 
particularly the realpolitik influence wielded by nuclear weapons states. 
Beyond the influence that nuclear weapons states can exercise through security assurances 
and nuclear umbrellas, a variety of other economic, political, and military instruments outside 
the NPT legal framework continues to be available for these powerful states to advance 
specific nonproliferation objectives. For example, both the United States and Russia had 
fundamental interests in ensuring that Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine took immediate 
steps to abandon the nuclear arsenals that they inherited from the former Soviet Union. The 
United States used a spectrum of incentives, assurances, and assistance programs to facilitate 
the transition of these states to a non-nuclear weapons status.14 Under the auspices of one 
of these instruments, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the United States spent 
hundreds of millions of dollars assisting in the removal of nuclear weapons, destroying 
related components, silos, and delivery vehicles, converting some facilities to peaceful uses, 
and establishing various programs in these states to prevent the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons technology and expertise.15 
In another area, the United States continues to advance specific nonproliferation goals through 
cooperative activities with many states under the Proliferation Security Initiative. This initiative 
and related projects, which include the coordinated interdiction of shipments of nuclear weapons 
technology and their delivery systems, have enjoyed some successes and are credited by some 
with playing a key role in the unraveling of a nascent Libyan nuclear weapons program.16 
Nuclear weapons states and their allies continue to develop and collaborate on a variety of other 
multilateral programs outside the NPT framework in an attempt to prevent nuclear nonprolifera 
tion. These include the implementation of common guidelines for nuclear exports through the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group and proposals to limit non-nuclear weapons states' development of 
sensitive nuclear facilities such as those used for uranium enrichment by providing an assured 
access to nuclear fuel and related nuclear fuel cycle services. 
11 
Japan is an example of a country with an understandably strong aversion to nuclear weapons that does not 
correspond with a national policy of rejecting nuclear protection. Following an apparent North Korean nuclear test, 
the Japanese government welcomed reassurances by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that "[t]he United 
States has the will and the capability to meet the full range?and I underscore full range?of its deterrent and 
security commitments to Japan." Thomas Shanker & Norimitsu Onishi, Japan Assures Rice That It Has No Nuclear 
Intentions, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 2006, at 14. At the same time, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and South 
Korean Defense Minister Yoon Kwang Ung approved a joint communique that emphasized the 
' 
'continuation of 
the extended deterrence offered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella" for South Korea. Glenn Kessler, China Gave 'Strong 
Message' To North Koreans, Rice Says; Beijing Is Called Ready to Apply U.N. Sanctions, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 
2006, at All. 12 
See, e.g,, Joseph S. Nye Jr., Nonproliferation After North Korea, Wash. Post, Nov. 5, 2006, at B7 ("Our allies 
in Europe and Japan were protected by our nuclear umbrella, and we told South Korea and Taiwan that our 
willingness to defend them would be jeopardized if they developed the bomb.") 13 
See, e.g., Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements 110 (2002). 14 
See, e.g., Bill Keller, The Thinkable, N.Y. Times, May 4, 2003, at 48 ("The first Bush administration and 
then the Clinton administration bargained hard for the surrender of Ukraine's weapons, promising abundant financial 
aid and a military partnership that Ukrainians hoped would lead to American security guarantees."). 15 
See generally James Clay Moltz, Introduction: Assessing United States Nonproliferation Assistance to the 
Newly-Independent States, 1 Nonproliferation Rev. 55, 56 (2000), available at <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/ 
vol07/7 l/intro71 .htm>. 
16 
See David Sanger, U.S. and Russia Will Police Potential Nuclear Terrorists, N.Y. Times, July 15, 2006, at A8. 
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By creating calculated political, economic, and military disincentives for other states, 
nuclear weapons states thus continue to wield considerable influence in preventing and 
discouraging other states from acquiring nuclear weapons. While the NPT may offer support 
ing mechanisms that make it more costly for states to develop or acquire nuclear weapons 
technology, it is difficult to determine the precise impact of those mechanisms and even 
more difficult to prove that they have been a decisive factor in nuclear nonproliferation, 
particularly in comparison with other forces. 
As nuclear weapons states continue to maintain security policies centered on their nuclear 
arsenals, do not seriously contemplate the abolition of nuclear weapons, and take no good 
faith efforts to achieve disarmament, the NPT legal regime remains divorced from the 
geopolitical framework in which it operates. To the extent that this gap is widened by actions 
of the great powers that emphasize the desirability of new or improved nuclear weapons 
systems and the possibility that more nuclear weapons testing will be required, the NPT is 
further weakened. Similarly, scholars who believe that it is critically important to maintain a 
strong taboo against the use of nuclear weapons are concerned that U.S. actions demonstrating 
continued reliance on nuclear weapons and the need for improved nuclear capabilities are 
likely to have a corrosive effect on that taboo.17 
On one level, "repairing" the centerpiece of the nonproliferation regime, the NPT, is a 
simple matter: amend the treaty to prohibit the possession of nuclear weapons by all states 
and require the immediate destruction of these weapons in order to eliminate the threat they 
pose to all humanity. Although not without a rational basis in a post-Cold War security 
environment,18 such a revision of the NPT regime is highly unlikely to be accepted by nuclear 
weapons states since it is contrary to their firmly established strategic policies. 
Continuing efforts to repair or improve the implementation of the NPT may yield some 
benefits,19 but the regime itself will continue to be undermined by blatant demonstrations 
of the asymmetrical nature of its rights and obligations. Nuclear weapons states, particularly 
the United States, could address this problem by taking steps toward decreasing the chasm 
between their disarmament obligations under the NPT and their current strategic policies 
and national security priorities. Barring such developments, however, an assessment of future 
options for dissuading, deterring or preventing new members from joining the nuclear club 
needs to take into account all the forces that have contributed to nuclear nonproliferation to 
this point in history and should not exaggerate the impact of the NPT. 
Replacing a Failed Nuclear Strategy 
By Joseph Cirincione* 
This discussion comes at a very important time in our national debate over our nuclear 
weapons strategy and nuclear proliferation policy. I believe we are standing at a nuclear 
17 
See, e.g., Thomas C. Schelling, The Nuclear Taboo, Wall St. J., Oct. 24, 2005, at A14. 
18 
See Goldblat, supra note 12, at 112-13 (concluding that arguments for preserving the option of using nuclear 
weapons against non-nuclear states are "not convincing" and describing as "surprising" the fact that nuclear 
postures have remained largely unchanged after the end of the Cold War in light of the limited, residual role that 
nuclear weapons play in deterring only the first use of an enemy's nuclear weapons). 
19 These useful efforts include attempts by the International Atomic Energy Agency to strengthen safeguards 
agreements and other transparency measures by making them more determinate and comprehensive, particularly 
in the context of the ongoing controversy surrounding Iran's nuclear activities. * 
Senior Fellow; Director for Nuclear Policy at the Center for American Progress and author of Bomb Scare: 
The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (Columbia University Press, 2007). 
